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THE WAITING GAME: EXAMINING LABOR 
LAW AND REASONS WHY THE WNBA 
NEEDS TO CHANGE ITS AGE/EDUCATION 
POLICY 
 
JESSICA L. HENDRICK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2015 Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) draft start-
ed with an expected, but somewhat controversial, selection of Notre Dame  
University star junior guard, Jewell Loyd, as the number one overall pick.1  
The controversy stems from Loyd’s decision to forgo her final year of eligibil-
ity and enter the draft early due to her age (twenty-two years old).  Her coach, 
Muffet McGraw commented, “I think it’s a really bad decision for women, es-
pecially to try to leave early.  They’re not making the money that the men 
make.”2  This kind of reception greatly differs from the men’s side in which 
the first three picks of the 2015 National Basketball Association (NBA) draft 
were all  
freshmen (Karl-Anthony Towns, D’Angelo Russell, and Jahlil Okafor).3  Why 
should a highly qualified female athlete have to wait four years or until the age 
of twenty-two to enter the WNBA draft while male athletes are often  
encouraged and occasionally expected to leave after only playing one year?  
The disparity in the reception towards Loyd’s draft compared to D’Angelo 
Russell or Jahlil Okafor’s draft illustrates the difference between how female 
college athletes are viewed compared to their male counterparts. 
                                                
* Jessica L. Hendrick is a J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School and the Articles & 
Research Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review.  She attended the University of Virginia and 
received a B.A. in History and in Women, Gender & Sexuality.  
1. Notre Dame’s Jewell Loyd Declares for WNBA Draft, USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaw/2015/04/08/ap-newsbreak-jewell-loyd-declares-for-
wnba-draft/25494797/. 
2. Kate Fagan, Why Jewell Loyd Leaving ND Early Is a Good Thing, ESPN (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/wnba/story/_/id/12699118/why-jewell-loyd-leaving-nd-early-good-thing. 
3. Eric Stephen, NBA Draft 2015: Pick-by-Pick Results, SBNATION (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2015/6/25/8847849/nba-draft-2015-results-pick-by-pick. 
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This Comment will examine whether the WNBA’s Age/Education Policy 
conflicts with labor law under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and 
suggests the league should modify its policy to allow for a younger entry age 
or a less demanding education requirement.  To begin analyzing these issues, 
Part II will detail the history of the WNBA and its connection to the NBA.  
Part III will explore collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and 
Age/Education  
Policies from the WNBA, the National Football League (NFL), and the NBA; 
and will discuss the litigation brought by players to contest the league’s  
respective rules.  Part IV will then consider labor law and the legal steps a  
female college basketball player would need to take to establish a legal claim 
against the WNBA.  After considering the legal possibilities, Part V will ex-
plain why the WNBA should change its policy due to larger social implica-
tions and some of the potential positive effects of a new policy.  Finally, Part 
VI will offer conclusive comments on the WNBA’s Age/Education Policy and 
the hope that one day female athletes will receive equitable treatment. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE WNBA 
A.      In the Beginning 
Although the WNBA is the most recognizable women’s professional  
basketball league, it was not the first.  In the 1970s two leagues appeared, the 
Ladies Professional Basketball Association and the Women’s Professional  
Basketball League, but both failed by 1981.4  In the early 1990s, a few small 
regional leagues appeared, but all had trouble drawing crowds.5  The next  
national league formed in 1992 and was called the American Basketball 
League (ABL).6  This league planned to have eight teams and a forty-game 
season  
running from October to February, but as it was on the verge of starting in 
                                                
4. Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Mandatory Age/Education Policy 
from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men and the Professional Sports Land-
scape, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4 (2008). 
5. Id. at 5.  These leagues included the Women’s Sports Association Professional Basketball 
League (WSAPL), the Women’s World Basketball Association (WWBA), and the Liberty Basketball  
Association (LBA).  Id.  These leagues thought staying regional would help lower costs; however, 
they all folded soon after forming.  The LBA tried to draw crowds by lowering the hoops to allow 
players to dunk and having the players wear spandex uniforms, but to no avail.  See id. (citing Ailene 
Voisin, Women’s League Planning Comeback, ATLANTA J.–CONST., Apr. 2, 1993, at E13). 
6. Id. 
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1995, the NBA announced it would sponsor its own separate women’s league.7 
 In 1996, David Stern, the then NBA Commissioner, announced the start of 
the league right before the U.S. Women’s Basketball team won the gold medal 
at the Atlanta Olympics.8  During its inaugural season, the league had eight 
teams and attracted top players such as Sheryl Swoopes, Rebecca Lobo, and 
Lisa Leslie.9  From the beginning, however, the WNBA had better standing 
than the ABL; and it was only a matter of time before the ABL folded in 1998, 
and subsequently filed for bankruptcy.10  Even though the WNBA paid players 
less than the ABL, the athletes saw a brighter future with the WNBA due to its  
connections with the NBA.11  
The NBA structured the WNBA in such a way that it could maintain  
longevity and keep costs low.12  To help with this, the NBA created the 
WNBA as a single-entity completely owned by the NBA, with some NBA 
teams  
choosing to operate individual WNBA teams.13  To keep costs low, the NBA: 
Assigned players to the league (not to a team); excluded the option of free 
agency; kept salaries low (few players made six-figure salaries and some bare-
ly made over $50,000); limited staff by using those who worked for NBA 
teams; used existing facilities owned by NBA teams; and used the pre-existing 
NBA marketing and branding strategies.14  These low-cost strategies, along 
with the backing of the NBA, allowed for the WNBA to overcome the initial 
burdens that new professional leagues face.15  However, it was not until 1998, 
after the WNBA had completed two seasons, did it establish a player’s union 
(the Women’s National Basketball Players Association (WNBPA)) and a 
CBA,16 which seems odd since the NBA has had both since the 1950s.17 
                                                
7. Id. at 5–6. 
8. Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, “We Got Next”: The Once and Future WNBA, in LEGAL ISSUES IN 
AMERICAN BASKETBALL 219, 228–29 (Lewis Kurlantzick ed., 2011). 
9. See WNBA History/Timeline, WNBA, 
http://www.wnba.com/archive/wnba/about_us/wnba_history_timeline_2012_04_30.html (last visited 
May 15, 2017). 
10. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
11. Id. at 7–9. 
12. Bridgeman, supra note 8, at 229–30. 
13. Id. at 230. 
14. Id. at 230–31. 
15. Id. at 232–33. 
16. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 4, at 9–10.  See generally About the WNBPA, WNBPA, 
http://wnbpa.com/about/ (last visited May 15, 2017). 
17. See About & History, NBPA, http://nbpa.com/about/ (last visited May 15, 2017).  
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B.     Turning Point 
For the first few years, the league appeared to handle the challenges of be-
ing a new professional league and benefitted from the connection with the 
NBA.  But in 2002, the WNBA decided—and needed to—make a significant 
change. At this point in time, the league had completed its sixth season but 
faced  
decreasing attendance and viewership.18  Additionally, WNBA players started 
to fight against the CBA, their main demands included: Increase salaries since 
they made significantly less than their male counterparts; altering the terms  
relating to free agency; and raising the salary cap.19  This led the NBA to  
restructure the WNBA to the mixed-mode format, which is the model used by 
the NBA, the NHL, the NFL, and MLB.20  The structural change allowed for 
vast league changes, such as allowing the stronger teams to retain more of 
their profits, and removing the obligation of NBA teams to subsidize a wom-
en’s team.21  Additionally, the new model gave greater opportunity for new 
owners with legitimate interests to own a team, and gave teams the ability to 
change locations to areas like Connecticut and Tennessee that have stronger 
ties to women’s college basketball.22  
These changes, which were adopted in the 2003–2006 CBA, modestly  
increased the average player’s salary, increased the salary cap, and altered the 
terms of free agency.23  Since the 2003–2006 CBA, only slight alterations have 
been made to the CBA.  The most recent CBA between the WNBA and the 
WNBPA was agreed upon in 2014 and lasts until 2021, with the main changes 
relating to improving salaries, increasing roster spots to twelve, and trying to 
balance players that travel to play overseas in the off-season.24  Based on these 
recent changes, one can see how the WNBA is balancing the changing  
atmosphere of women’s professional basketball by adjusting to the needs of 
the players (especially those who play year-round) while also ensuring the 
                                                
18. See Bridgeman, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 234. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 234–35. 
23. Id. at 235. 
24. See Nate Parham, WNBA’s New Collective Bargaining Agreement Reflects Owners’ Interest in 
Limiting Offseason Play in Foreign Leagues, SWISH APPEAL (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.swishappeal.com/2014/3/10/5485828/wnba-collective-bargaining-agreement-time-off-
bonus.  See generally WNBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2014), http://wnbpa-
uploads.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/WNBA%20CBA%202014-2021Final.pdf [hereinafter WNBA 
CBA]. 
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league’s survival, which could indicate a willingness to update some rules to 
better  
maintain the league’s reputation. 
III. LEAGUE CBAS AND THE AGE/EDUCATION POLICIES 
The WNBA’s CBA has a section titled “Player Eligibility and WNBA 
Draft,”25 which details when a player can enter the draft. This policy states a 
player can enter the draft if she: 
 
(i) [W]ill be at least twenty-two (22) years old during the  
calendar year in which such Draft is held and she either has no 
remaining intercollegiate eligibility or renounces her remain-
ing intercollegiate eligibility by written notice to the WNBA 
at least ten (10) days prior to such draft; (ii) [H]as graduated 
from a four-year college or university prior to such Draft, or 
“is to graduate” from such college or university within the 
three  
(3)-month period following such Draft and she either has no 
remaining intercollegiate eligibility or renounces her remain-
ing intercollegiate eligibility by written notice to the WNBA 
at least ten (10) days prior to such Draft . . . .26 
 
The section goes on to state that a player can be eligible for the draft if her 
college class is about to graduate or has graduated, and international players 
(who can be amateur or professional) can enter if they are born and reside  
outside the United States and are at least twenty years old.27  The two main 
ways a player enters the WNBA Draft are graduating from college or being  
twenty-two years old.  These requirements greatly differ from the male  
professional leagues.  For example, the NBA requires a player to be at least 
nineteen years old, to have at least one NBA Season elapsed since the player 
graduated from high school, and to notify the NBA that he will be an “Early 
Entry” to the draft.28  As for the NFL, its policy states that a player will be  
eligible for the draft only if three NFL seasons pass after the player’s high 
                                                
25. WNBA CBA, supra note 24, art. XIII, § 1(b)(i)–(ii). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. art. XIII, §§ 1(b)(iii), (d)–(e). 
28. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. X, § 1(b)(i)–(ii)(F) (2017), 
http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr32v9qof.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2017-
NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf. 
HENDRICK 27.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  10:03 AM 
526 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
school graduation.29  
Although the WNBA’s policy is inspiring, since most of the female col-
lege basketball players enter the draft after graduating, there is something un-
settling with the notion that women are forced to continue education while 
men are not.  Compared to the NBA and NFL policies, the WNBA’s policy is 
more extensive and demanding of the athlete.  A female college basketball 
player⎯upset over her inability to enter the WNBA prior to gradua-
tion⎯would only need to look towards the legal history of Age/Education Pol-
icies lawsuits against the NBA and the NFL to see how courts have decided 
cases challenging these policies. 
 A.     Evolution of Current Age/Education Policies 
Some may not know the extent of the history and development of CBAs, 
professional leagues, and Age/Education Policies.  Versions of the policy 
range from an unspoken agreement among club owners to becoming formal-
ized rules in a league’s CBA.30  The main reasons why there is so much re-
sistance from college players regarding an Age/Education Policy are the in-
creased possibility of getting injured while playing in college (especially a 
career-ending injury)31 and the loss of possible future earnings upon entering 
the draft and the league.32  These two motivating factors are the same for male 
and female college athletes, with the main difference being that men make 
more money and have less  
restrictive Age/Education rules to overcome.  Much of this does relate to the 
history and longevity of the NFL and the NBA, which allowed their policies to 
evolve over time to a somewhat acceptable middle ground.   
The NFL’s Age/Education Policy (Age/Education Policy) started from a 
general agreement among club owners not to recruit players that had yet to  
                                                
29. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VI, § 2(b) (2011), 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf.  
30. See generally Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education  
Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341 (2010). 
31. For example, former Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) point guard, Briante Weber, 
suffered a season ending injury when he torn his ACL and MCL, causing him to miss the rest of his 
senior season and drastically impacted his ability to enter the 2015 draft healthy.  See Brandon Di 
Perno, Former VCU Guard, Briante Weber Fails Physical at Heat Camp, HOT HOT HOOPS (Sept. 11, 
2015), http://www.hothothoops.com/2015/9/11/9313205/former-vcu-guard-briante-webber-fails-
physical-at-miami-heat-camp-nba-virginia-university; see also N. Jeremi Duru, Hoop Dreams De-
ferred: The WNBA, the NBA, and the Long-Standing Gender Inequity at the Game’s Highest Level, 
2015 UTAH L. REV. 559, 577–80. 
32. See Duru, supra note 31, at 577–85. 
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graduate from college.33  But this unspoken policy was not always followed, 
and in 1926, the team owners ratified a bylaw that forbade them from enticing 
college players to play professionally.34  At first the club-owners enforced the 
policy, but in 1935 this became the responsibility of the NFL Commissioner to 
enforce.35  From 1926 to 1989, the Age/Education Policy did not change, but 
two commissioners—Pete Rozelle and Paul Tagliabue—each exercised their 
power and allowed one player to enter the league early.36  The first player 
(Andy Livingston) was allowed to enter the league early because he impreg-
nated his high school girlfriend and dropped out of school to support his fami-
ly.37  The other player, Barry Sanders, submitted a fourteen-page petition stat-
ing he had the requisite athletic ability (Sanders had just won the Heisman 
Trophy), he needed the money due to his family’s economic status, and he was 
playing at a university facing sanctions, which would limit his television expo-
sure.38   
Because of these two exceptions, in 1990 there was a staggering forty petitions 
from college players requesting the NFL Commissioner (at the time Paul  
Tagliabue) give them some kind of exemption from the Age/Education Policy 
to enter the draft early.39 
Out of concern for a possible antitrust lawsuit, Commissioner Tagliabue, 
along with the club owners, agreed to change the Age/Education Policy to al-
low college juniors to enter the draft.40  Even with the policy changes, players 
still submitted requests to the NFL Commissioner for an exemption; for exam-
ple, Maurice Clarett, who in 2004 brought an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NFL.41  Before 2006, the policy was not part of the CBA, but was a bylaw en-
forced by the NFL.  One could interpret the absence of this policy in the 
NFL’s CBA as an issue that players were not too concerned with, but worried 
the league, which was why the Commissioner was in charge of monitoring and 
enforcing it.  Thus, one could conclude that current players are not concerned 
with or bothered by the policy—indicating they may not be actively trying to 
change the rule during negotiations—but the league is the one that is directing 
                                                
33. See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 343–44. 
34. Id. at 346. 
35. Id. at 346–47. 
36. Id. at 347. 
37. Id. 
38. Id.  
39. Id. at 347–48. 
40. Id. at 348. 
41. Id. at 349–53. 
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the policy’s direction and preventing any kind of change if the issue is ever 
discussed.  
The NBA has a similar history when it comes to its Age/Education Policy. 
Its policy dates back to 1969, but some say the inception date was actually 
1949.42  Although it initially stated that players were not eligible unless they 
were four years out of high school, the rule changed due to a lawsuit brought 
by Spencer Haywood in 1971.  After the case, the NBA altered its policy simi-
lar to that of the NFL’s in which players could file a petition asking for early 
entry into the draft.43  However, this policy did not last long, and in 1976, the 
NBA completely abandoned an Age/Education Policy.44 
Due to the lack of an Age/Education Policy, the NBA allowed high school 
seniors and college players from any year to enter the draft.45  It soon became 
commonplace for high school seniors and college freshmen to be picked early 
in the draft selections.46  In 2005, the NBA and the National Basketball Player 
Association re-implemented an Age/Education Policy in the CBA, stating that 
a player can enter the draft if he is at least nineteen years old and has waited 
one NBA season since his high school graduation.47  The 2011–2021 CBA still  
implements this one-year rule, meaning most players attend college for one 
year, commonly referred to as one-and-done, while a few players elect to go 
overseas for that one year to start making money.  The major issue stemming 
from the NBA’s policy is the impact it has on college basketball because it 
makes it more difficult for college teams to develop a program around a solid 
team since key players plan to leave after playing for only one year.48 
As for the WNBA, the league has the same policy in place since its incep-
tion due to its close ties with the NBA,49 and it was officially put in the 1999 
CBA.50  During this time, there were quality players that had graduated college 
and were readily available to play in the league, as proven by the U.S. Wom-
en’s Team performance in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.  This arguably made 
                                                
42. Id. at 354. 
43. Id. at 355–56. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 356–57. 
46. Id. at 357–58. 
47. See id. at 359.  See also NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement Ratified and Signed, NBA (Ju-
ly 30, 2005), http://www.nba.com/news/CBA_050730.html. 
48. See Dylan Hernandez, College Basketball’s So-Called One-and-Done Rule Needs Revisiting, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-college-one-and-done-hernandez-
20160324-story.html. 
49. See Duru, supra note 31, at 575–76. 
50. Id. 
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college players less attractive to professional teams since there were great, ma-
ture players  
readily available.  Also, since the WNBA was such a new league, it was a 
huge risk for a college player to give up her education on what was a small 
chance of being drafted.  There appears to be no concern with the effects of 
this rule on the WNBA, as shown by each CBA allowing for the rule to remain 
unchanged.  It can be argued the Age/Education Policy is a hindrance to the 
development and growth of the WNBA and should be changed, either by a 
college player bringing a lawsuit or by a change made to the CBA by the 
WNBPA and the WNBA.  
 B.     Legal Precedent Relating to Age/Education Policies 
The two controlling areas of law related to the Age/Education Policy are 
antitrust law and labor law.  Antitrust law and labor law are not mutually  
exclusive and courts have discussed the two in conjunction when faced with 
this policy.  The overlap between these areas of law is the Clayton Act and  
Norris-LaGuardia Act.51  Although the two are interrelated, male athletes have 
brought antitrust lawsuits about the Age/Education Policy against professional 
leagues since the 1970s.52  The NFL and the NBA are the main professional 
leagues that appear to have a long, tumultuous history of dealing with disputes 
over such a policy.  Most of the arguments used to combat an Age/Education 
Policy have been the same regardless of the sport or league.  The players’ 
main concerns are the possibility of getting injured and the desire to make 
money while at the early stages of their athletic careers, compared to the 
league and Players Association that are focused on creating a good, mature 
product.53  These cases are influential in demonstrating how courts approach 
an  
Age/Education Policy claim. 
The following cases mainly focus on an antitrust analysis in which a court 
applies either the per se analysis, the Rule of Reason analysis, or the quick-
look Rule of Reason analysis (also known as the quick-look test).  The kind of  
conduct in question influences which test a court uses.  If the action is per se 
                                                
51. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2016); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 
(2016). 
52. See, e.g., Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1976); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Denver Rockets v.  
All-Pro Mgmt. Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
53. See Nitin Sharma, An Antitrust and Public Policy Analysis of the NBA’s Age/Education Poli-
cy: At Least One Road Leads to Rome, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 485–86 (2010). 
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illegal, such as a group boycott or horizontal restraints on trade, a court will 
apply the per se test.54  For the quick-look test, courts mainly consider if there 
are any reasonable procompetitive economic justifications for the restraint on 
trade, and if not, then the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive 
justifications, which is a violation of the Sherman Act.55  The Rule of Reason 
analysis focuses on “whether the restraint imposed is justified by legitimate 
business purposes, and is no more restrictive than necessary.”56  
 In order to exempt a CBA provision from antitrust laws, the subject matter 
must fall under the non-statutory labor exemption.  This exemption precludes 
an antitrust challenge to the CBA, and in effect strengthens the ability of labor 
parties, such as Players Associations, to unionize and bargain over player 
wages and working conditions.57  Thus, when a court is faced with a sports an-
titrust lawsuit questioning the validity of a CBA’s policy, the court will dis-
cuss labor law to determine if the policy in question is exempt.  
One of the first cases that brought the issue of an Age/Education Policy to 
the forefront was Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc., a 1971 case 
brought by Spencer Haywood.58  At the time Haywood was trying to enter the 
league the NBA’s policy stated that a player had to be at least four years  
removed from high school to be eligible—at the time he was only two years 
removed.59  Haywood had played at a community college, transferred to a  
university, and signed with the Denver Rockets of the American Basketball  
Association (ABA).60  In an attempt to move to the NBA, Haywood tried to 
get out of his contract with the ABA, but the NBA’s eligibility rules precluded 
him from signing with the Seattle Supersonics since he was not four years re-
moved from the time of his high school graduation.61  Haywood brought his 
claim against the NBA’s policy, arguing that it violated section 1 of the Sher-
man Act; the court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Hay-
wood.62 
The court in Denver Rockets applied the per se analysis because a group 
boycott had previously been found to be a complex practice that outweighed 
                                                
54. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
55. See id. at 13–14; see also Sharma, supra note 53, at 490. 
56. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. 
57. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (2d ed. 2014). 
58. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
59. Id. at 1055. 
60. Id. at 1052. 
61. Id. at 1054. 
62. Id. at 1066–67. 
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the benefits from that practice.63  One of the main arguments the NBA used to  
justify its Age/Education Policy was the league’s desire to give players an  
“opportunity to complete four years of college prior to beginning his  
professional basketball career.”64  The court recognized how “commendable 
this desire may be, [but the] court is not in a position to say that this considera-
tion should override the objective of fostering economic competition which is  
embodied in the antitrust laws.”65  The result of this case forced the NBA to 
change its policy to one that allowed college students and high school seniors 
to enter the league.66 
The next influential decision came from the Eighth Circuit in 1976.  In 
Mackey v. NFL, a class action of former and present NFL players claimed the 
rule relating to a player’s free agency, the Rozelle Rule, made teams hesitate 
when it came to signing free agents and it also reduced their salaries.67  In the 
end, the Eighth Circuit held the rule violated antitrust law due to a lack of  
arm’s-length bargaining over the policy.68  In order to reach its decision, the 
court first considered labor law to determine if the Rozelle Rule fell under the 
non-statutory labor exemption,69 and then looked to antitrust law to decide 
whether the rule violated the Sherman Act.70 
The Mackey case is important because the Eighth Circuit, in analyzing the 
Rozelle Rule, set out three factors to consider if there are competing interests 
between labor law and antitrust law: (1) Whether the restrictions implemented 
by the labor policy affect “only the parties to the collective bargaining  
relationship;” (2) whether the subject-matter of the agreement is a “mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining;” and (3) whether the restrictions come from 
an agreement reached at “bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”71  Mackey met 
the first two prongs, but the Eighth Circuit found there was no bona fide bar-
gaining in the NFL’s 1968 and 1970 CBAs, and thus was not exempt from an-
titrust scrutiny.72  This case set forth the three-part test that has been widely 
                                                
63. Id. at 1063 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)). 
64. Id. at 1066. 
65. Id. 
66. See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 354–55. 
67. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). 
68. Id. at 623. 
69. Id. at 611. 
70. Id. at 616. 
71. Id. at 614.  See Andrew M. Jones, Hold the Mayo: An Analysis of the Validity of the NBA’s 
Stern No Preps to Pros Rule and the Application of the Nonstatutory Exemption, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L. REV. 475, 495 (2006). 
72. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. 
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used by courts in sports related cases to determine if the non-statutory labor 
exemption applies.73  
A more recent decision relating to the Age/Education Policy comes from 
the Second Circuit in an opinion delivered by now Supreme Court Justice  
Sotomayor.  In Clarett v. NFL, the court found the NFL’s Age/Education Poli-
cy fell under the non-statutory labor exemption, making the rules a mandatory  
bargaining topic.74  Maurice Clarett played for Ohio State University, but was 
forced to sit out his sophomore season, which increased his desire to enter the 
NFL Draft.75  However, the NFL’s Age/Education Policy stated a player could 
only enter the draft if three NFL seasons have passed since the player’s high 
school graduation.76  Similar to Haywood in Denver Rockets, Clarett claimed 
the rule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.77  To combat the argument, the 
NFL asserted “federal labor law favoring and governing the collective  
bargaining process precludes the application of the antitrust laws to its eligibil-
ity rules.”78 
The Second Circuit noted the Age/Education Policy falls under the  
non-statutory labor exemption, which protects the National Labor Relations 
Board’s (NLRB) function and ensures the meaningful process of collective  
bargaining.79  Clarett argued the NFL’s Policy did not fall under the  
non-statutory labor exemption and that the court should follow the Eight  
Circuit’s decision in Mackey.80  But the Second Circuit did not find Mackey to 
be applicable or controlling in this case, and the court found the eligibility rule 
to be a mandatory bargaining subject.81  It viewed the case as “a prospective 
employee’s disagreement with the criteria, established by the employer and  
labor union, that he must meet in order to be considered for employment.”82  
Thus, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and found the 
Age/Education Policy fell under the non-statutory exemption therefore barring 
any antitrust claim.83 
                                                
73. See Jones, supra note 71, at 496. 
74. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
75. Id. at 125–26. 
76. Id. at 126. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 130. 
79. Id. at 131. 
80. Id. at 133.  
81. Id. at 133, 139. 
82. Id. at 143. 
83. Id. 
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These cases illustrate how complex and intertwined antitrust and labor law 
are when it comes to a league’s Age/Education Policy in its CBA.  A female 
athlete could bring the same antitrust claims against the WNBA when arguing 
its policy violates section 1 of the Sherman Act, and would most likely be de-
nied in the same manner as the Clarett case.  Depending on the circuit, espe-
cially whether it is the Second or the Eighth, one of the two tests, i.e., Clarett 
or Mackey, will be used to determine the validity of the claim, and the player 
will likely lose simply based upon precedent.  
IV. LABOR LAW AND AGE/EDUCATION POLICY 
Although a lawsuit claiming an antitrust violation will most likely not be 
successful for the players, there has yet to be a case brought solely under labor 
law that challenges a league’s Age/Education Policy.  Using labor law cases, 
there is some insight on how a court could approach and analyze a case 
brought by a female college basketball player against the WNBA. 
 A.     Background on Labor Law 
The Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act84 note that labor unions are 
not restraints on trades and that certain activities are exempt from antitrust 
law.85  Although these acts allow for statutory exemptions, the NLRA, which 
governs labor law and unions, is most relevant to issues relating to an 
Age/Education Policy.86  
 The governing source when it comes to labor laws and collective bargain-
ing is the NLRA.87  The NLRA was created in order to “protect the rights of  
employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail 
certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the  
general welfare of workers, businesses[,] and the U.S. economy.”88  Section 7 
of the NLRA lists the rights of employees to include the ability to: (1) 
“[F]orm, join, or assist labor organizations;” (2) “bargain collectively through  
representatives of their own choosing;” and (3) “engage in other concerted  
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or  
                                                
84. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
85. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976). 
86. Id. at 611–12.  
87. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2016).  See Kevin W. Brooks, “Physical-
ly Ready to Compete”: Can Players’ Unions Bar Potential Draftees Based on Their Age?, 21 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 89, 93 (2014). 
88. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-
relations-act (last visited May 15, 2017).  
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protection.”89  The second element is the one most relevant when it comes to 
questioning the Players Association and the league’s CBA.  Other important 
NLRA sections that relate to labor unions include: Section 8, which details  
various forms of unfair labor practices, and section 9, which explains exclu-
sive representation and how elections should be conducted.90 
To begin an analysis of a female college basketball player’s possible labor 
law claim, the first step is to recognize the Second Circuit’s decision in Clarett 
that found the Age/Education Policy to be a mandatory bargaining subject and 
subject to the non-statutory labor exemption—making it exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny.91  After understanding that antitrust law is not the proper avenue, the 
player would need to show the WNBPA breached its duty of fair representa-
tion under the NLRA. A player would bring the claim to the NLRB, and 
would have the ability to appeal the decision to a federal district court. 
A labor union only consists of active members in the league, which means 
college athletes do not have their own representative in the WNBPA and are 
bound by the CBA.92  One of the major points of contention in labor law relat-
ing to CBAs is whether prospective employees are represented by the union.  
The NLRA defines “employee” as “any employee” and proceeds to list who 
falls within the seemingly vague definition.93  This is a very broad definition 
that courts have interpreted in different manners.  
 B.     Legal Discussion 
One of the first influential cases in labor law was in 1944.  In Steele v.  
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,94 the Supreme Court noted that those elected 
to act on behalf of other members have a duty to fairly represent all mem-
bers.95  The Supreme Court noted that “the organization chosen to represent a 
craft is to represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority, and it 
is to act for and not against those whom it represents.”96  Additionally, the Su-
preme Court noted that a labor union has to perform its duty to all those it rep-
resents, and is required “to represent non-union or minority union members . . 
                                                
89. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
90. See id. §§ 158–159. 
91. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
92. MITTEN, supra note 57, at 112. 
93. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  
94. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
95. Id. at 202. 
96. Id. 
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. without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”97  The 
downside of this case is that it specifically dealt only with the Railway Labor 
Act and did not apply to labor unions under the NLRA.98  It was not until 1953 
that the Supreme Court recognized that the unions under the NLRA owed a 
duty to fairly  
represent its members.99   
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman100 formally  
recognized the duty of fair representation under the NLRA.  The Court held 
that the members in the labor organization represent the employees during  
negotiation and “is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests 
of all whom it represents,”101 but acknowledged that “differences arise in the  
manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect  
individual employees and classes of employees.”102  This decision granted a 
“wide range of reasonableness” to the bargaining representative that is “sub-
ject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose” while using his  
discretion.103 
These two cases form the framework that subsequent labor law cases  
followed when considering the duty of fair representation.  This duty is 
breached when the union’s conduct is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith.”104  Therefore, a female college basketball player that attacks the 
WNBA’s  
Age/Education Policy would need to show the WNBPA, which is a union, 
breached its duty in representing prospective athletes.105 
A key part of the analysis involves defining who belongs to the union.  
Some courts are more restrictive in defining who is an employee and what 
kind of interests they have in the collective bargaining process.  In Allied 
Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
the Supreme Court held that retired employees fell outside the meaning of 
“employee,” and the union and employer did not have to collectively bargain 
                                                
97. Id. at 204. 
98. Brooks, supra note 87, at 92–93. 
99. Id. at 94. 
100. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
101. Id. at 338. 
102. Id.  
103. Id.  See also Brooks, supra note 87, at 95. 
104. MITTEN, supra note 57, at 112 (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 
1985)). 
105. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959–60 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Edelman & Wacker, supra 
note 30, at 367–68. 
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in a way that  
benefited retired employees.106  The significance of this case is to recognize 
the importance of being deemed an “employee” within the terms of CBA.  If  
someone is not an employee, then the labor union would not have a duty of 
fair representation to that person, and thus that person’s concern would not be 
a priority during negotiations.  If a female college basketball player did not 
falling within the meaning of “employee,” the WNBPA would not have to 
consider that player’s interest when negotiating the CBA. 
To combat this opinion, a player could look to a 1965 Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in which prospective employees were represented by the labor union.107  
In NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, 
Inc., the employers and the labor union discussed the process of hiring new  
employees, and one of the key factors considered was whether a person was a 
member or non-member in a labor union.108  The Fifth Circuit noted that if  
membership in a union is not compulsory, then the union could not discrimi-
nate between members and non-members.109  Essentially the union had to rep-
resent both current and prospective employees,110 which would be beneficial 
to a  
female college basketball player bringing a claim against the WNBPA.  The 
downfall in relation to a player’s claim is the Supreme Court’s decision in Al-
lied Chemical is more legally persuasive than the Fifth’s Circuit decision, and 
would only be persuasive in any kind of legal proceeding.  
In order to determine mandatory bargaining subjects, sections 8(a) and 
8(d) of the NLRA need to be read in conjunction.111  The Supreme Court said 
that in reading these two provisions together, the employer and the labor union 
are  
obligated to bargain in good faith regarding “wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment.”112  Additionally, it is the agreement’s practi-
cal  
effort, not its form, that determines if the provision concerns a mandatory  
                                                
106. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 
157, 165 (1971). 
107. NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 451–52 
(5th Cir. 1965).  See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 367–68. 
108. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 349 F.2d at 450–51. 
109. Id. at 453. 
110. See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 368. 
111. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1958). 
112. Id. at 349.  See Jones, supra note 71, at 509. 
HENDRICK 27.2 FINAL - COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  10:03 AM 
2017] WNBA AND ITS AGE/EDUCATION POLICY  537 
subject.113  Typically, when bringing an antitrust claim relating to labor law, 
the non-statutory labor exemption would apply, and if the policy falls under it, 
then it would imply an antitrust violation.114  But if a player were to just bring 
a labor law claim, then it would seem frivolous to mention the non-statutory 
labor  
exemption since it applies mainly to antitrust law claims that relate to manda-
tory bargaining subjects.115 
The next step in finding if the Age/Education Policy violates labor law is 
demonstrating whether the WNBPA breached its duty of fair representation.  
One of the ways in which to prove a breach of fair representation is to show 
that the bargaining process was somehow arbitrary.116  An act is arbitrary 
“when it simply ignores a meritorious grievance or handles it in a perfunctory 
manner,” is “without rational basis,” or is “egregious, unfair[,] and unrelated 
to legitimate union interests.”117  The main problem with claiming the 
WNBPA’s conduct is arbitrary is that it refers to a failure to follow rules or the 
process of the  
agreement, not the policy itself.118 
Another way to prove the WNBPA breached its duty of fair representation 
is to claim it acted in a discriminatory manner.  Similar to defining “employ-
ee,” determining whether a labor union acts in a discriminatory manner ranges 
from a narrow to a broad interpretation.119  The narrow interpretation focuses 
on the class of employees being discriminated against, specifically if the em-
ployees belong to a constitutionally or statutorily protected group.120  From a 
narrow view, a prospective player would have very little chance of success 
since college athletes are not a protected class.  
As for the broad view, a female college basketball player may have greater 
success at bringing a claim by arguing the members in the Players Association 
want to preserve their position in the league and would do so to the detriment 
of younger, qualified players.121  There are positive and negative factors that 
can sway a court to favoring either the athlete, or the league and the Players  
                                                
113. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
114. Id. 
115. See Jones, supra note 71, at 509–10. 
116. See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 370. 
117. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985).  
118. Id. at 1253.  See Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 370. 
119. Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 371–72. 
120. Id. at 374. 
121. Id. at 373. 
HENDRICK 27.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  10:03 AM 
538 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
Association.  A key factor would be that the WNBA is the only American 
women’s professional basketball league, and preventing qualified players from 
entering the league early limits their opportunity to pursue their chosen  
career.122  Some of the bigger, better paying international teams want the star 
WNBA players because the league is one of the best in the world and the U.S. 
produces quality players.  Denying early entry of a standout college player 
could hurt her internationally and domestically.  However, the player’s age 
does not necessarily correlate to salary.  Even though rookies are paid less 
than veteran players, many players get extra money through endorsements 
based on skill and attraction, not age.  Claiming a breach of duty of fair repre-
sentation due to  
discrimination under a broad view could be successful, but there are other  
factors that impact the court’s decision that could outweigh this position.  
The final option to prove the WNBPA breached its duty is to show that it 
acted in bad faith when it collectively bargained.  This kind of breach is often 
illustrated by claiming the union was dishonest or had the desire to mislead 
players.123  To prove this, a female college basketball player would need  
evidence of some kind of “backdoor deal” demonstrating the Players  
Association had bad intentions.124  This would seem like the best option in try-
ing to show a breach of the duty of fair representation.  For example, a female  
college basketball player could argue the WNBPA financially favors the cur-
rent players over the rookies and heavily limits the player selection pool be-
cause playing four years in college increases the probability of getting in-
jured.125  A player could also try to show that members of the WNBPA are 
protecting their interests by maintaining a smaller talent pool and ensuring a 
certain competitive level by only having older, mature players.126  However, 
                                                
122. Id. at 375 n.235. 
123. See generally id. at 370; Brooks, supra note 87, at 119–20. 
124. Edelman & Wacker, supra note 30, at 371. 
125. See Brooks, supra note 87, at 119–20. 
126. This is asserting that veteran players could be concerned about being replaced by younger 
players and their overall longevity in the league if younger players could replace them.  Additionally, 
with not every available college player going to the WNBA, teams can maintain the same roster for a 
number of years thus enhancing team chemistry and the chances of winning the league championship.  
For example, the Los Angeles Sparks won the 2016 WNBA Championship, and the team only has 
two rookies and two players with one-year experience.  See Roster, L.A. SPARKS, 
http://sparks.wnba.com 
/roster/ (last visited May 15, 2017).  Similarly, the Minnesota Lynx, the team that lost to the Sparks in 
2016 Finals, has only one rookie.  See Roster, MINN. LYNX, http://lynx.wnba.com/roster/ (last visited 
May 15, 2017).  Both teams have strong veteran foundations that have made them top contenders over 
the recent years. 
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this could be hard to prove because it is an understood part of labor unions that 
not all members will be completely satisfied with all the terms.127  
A major hindrance to a claim against a league’s Age/Education Policy is 
the fact that younger people are not protected under the Age Discrimination in  
Employment Act (ADEA).128  A labor union can exclude younger members by 
favoring policies that benefit the older members.129  This notion decreases the 
likelihood that a court, or the NLRB, would rule in favor of a female basket-
ball player.  As the Supreme Court noted in Ford Motor Co., “[t]he complete  
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.”130  State law 
could seem to be a way to maneuver around a rule favoring older members 
over younger ones, but federal laws like the ADEA will preempt state laws, in  
addition to courts being more deferential to labor unions and the collective  
bargaining process.  
What could make this issue more compelling and interesting is if the 
NLRB found student-athletes were employees.  Members of the Northwestern  
University football team brought the issue of employment to the NLRB, and 
the board decided that “asserting jurisdiction in this case would not promote  
stability in labor relations.”131  Although it is unclear whether the Board may 
rehear this topic due to its volatile nature relating to two important areas of 
sports—college and professional—it would still be interesting to see what af-
fect student-athlete unions would have on professional leagues and Players  
Associations.  It would conceivably make collective bargaining efforts more 
difficult, but college players could feel better about their position if, or when, 
they enter the professional league. 
Due to the lack of direct legal precedent, a female college basketball play-
er would need to make a very persuasive argument as to why the WNBA’s 
Age/Education Policy violates labor law.  However, the odds would not be in 
the player’s favor because “a union balances many collective and individual 
interests in deciding whether and to what extent it will pursue a particular  
grievance, [and] courts should ‘accord substantial deference’ to a union’s  
                                                
127. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); Brooks, supra note 87, at 120. 
128. MITTEN, supra note 57, at 108 (explaining that the ADEA protects only to those who are 40 
or older). 
129. Id. 
130. Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 338. 
131. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, *5 (2015).  See Tom Farrey, 
NLRB Says Northwestern Players Cannot Unionize, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13455477/nlrb-says-northwestern-players-cannot-
unionize. 
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decisions regarding such matters.”132  If a court is to give deference to the 
WNBPA and has the ability to apply a strict definition of “employee,” along 
with the league arguing there has never been a problem with the 
Age/Education Policy, the prospective player’s labor law claim would be an 
up-hill battle.  Overall, a player could bring the claim and make very persua-
sive arguments as to why the WNBA should be forced to change its policy; 
however, the outcome may not be surprising to the legal community. 
V. COMMENTS ABOUT THE WNBA’S POLICY 
The WNBA’s Age/Education Policy has been enforced since the league 
started and has been a part of its CBA since 1999.133  Even though Jewell 
Loyd was not the first to leave college early (Candace Parker left Tennessee in 
2008 with one year of eligibility remaining), it seems she received heavy criti-
cism for doing so.134  Women face the same concerns regarding the possibility 
of injury and salary as men, but the league views the positives—being female 
role models and maintaining competitive teams at the collegiate and profes-
sional levels—as key reasons for keeping the policy.135 
A possible solution would be to allow female basketball players who  
complete their degrees in less than four years to enter the league.  Many  
student-athletes enroll in summer classes to help relieve some of the academic 
pressures during season.  Additionally, if a student-athlete enters college with 
more high-school credits and maintains a balanced load during the school year 
and summer, they could complete a degree in three years and could possibly 
be ready to enter the draft early.  This would apply to a very small number of  
athletes and would require constant work, but it would still maintain and up-
hold the WNBA’s emphasis on academics. 
Another reason why the WNBA should consider altering the rule is be-
cause many of the big-named veterans, like Sue Bird and Diana Taurasi, are 
getting older.  Although this happens to every team and player, these big name 
players are even more important for the WNBA so it can continue to keep 
drawing fans’ attention and television viewership.  Even though Maya Moore 
is one of the younger well-known players, there has yet to be any recent, out-
standing players in the league.  Arguments could be made that the Griner–
Delle Donne–Diggins 2013 draft was the last draft that featured big-named 
                                                
132. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985). 
133. See Duru, supra note 31, at 575–76. 
134. See Fagan, supra note 2. 
135. See Duru, supra note 31, at 586–89. 
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players, and that they are the future of the WNBA.  But as the league loses 
major veterans, there needs to be younger players, such as Breanna Stewart, to 
draw crowds and to help teams build their franchises. 
Yet the biggest concern for the WNBA is players going overseas during 
the off-season.  This is best illustrated by Diana Taurasi’s absence in the 2015 
WNBA season.136  Taurasi was a standout star when she played at the Univer-
sity of Connecticut, is an impact player for the Phoenix Mercury, and is a 
member of the U.S. National Women’s Basketball team (as well as being a 
recognizable name).  But, Taurasi decided to forgo playing the 2015 season 
because her  
Russian team (UMMC Yekaterinburh) could pay her almost triple her WNBA 
salary.137  Many international leagues in China, Russia, and Europe can pay  
female basketball players more than the WNBA.  Although there are the  
downsides of playing overseas, such as language barriers, being the only  
American on a team, and living for four months in a foreign country, the up-
side is the money and the gratitude shown by the locals for the player’s 
skills.138  Additionally, with the continuing disparity in salary between the 
WNBA and the NBA, there is less incentive for American women to play in 
the WNBA due to the risk of burning out and injuries.139  Even though the 
bigger names will still play in the WNBA, the more important question is how 
long can the WNBA compete with international leagues who can offer better 
salaries and are willing to pay for players not to play in the WNBA?  
Along the lines of international games, every four years professional  
athletes vie for a spot on the U.S. Olympic team.  What seems important to 
note is the difference in the “star” value between the men’s and women’s 
teams.  For the 2016 Rio Olympics, the men’s team seemed sparse in big-
name players and only had two players with prior Olympic experience;140 
                                                
136. See Kate Fagan, Diana Taurasi’s Decision to Sit out Should Spark WNBA Salary Changes, 
ESPN (Feb. 4, 2015), http://espn.go.com/wnba/story/_/id/12272036/diana-taurasi-decision-sit-spark-
wnba-salary-changes [hereinafter Fagan, Diana Taurasi]; Kate Fagan, Britney Griner & Diana 
Taurasi Opted to Play in Russia Both for Money and Escape from the Spotlight, ESPN (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/page/espnw-russia160505/brittney-griner-diana-taurasi-
opted-play-russia-money-escape-spotlight [hereinafter Fagan, Britney Griner]. 
137. See Fagan, Diana Taurasi, supra note 136. 
138. See Seth Berkman, Overseas, Lost in Transition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/sports/basketball/transition-game-wnba-players-battle-the-blues-
in-first-season-abroad.html?_r=0; Fagan, Britney Griner, supra note 136. 
139. Fagan, Diana Taurasi, supra note 136. 
140. USA Basketball Announces 2016 U.S. Olympic Men’s Basketball Team, USA BASKETBALL 
(June 27, 2016), http://www.usab.com/news-events/news/2016/06/2016-moly-team-announced.aspx.  
See Victor Mather, No Steph Curry. No LeBron James. It Won’t Matter for U.S. Basketball in Rio, 
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however, the women’s team featured nine veterans.141  This is not to say the 
men’s team is less  
qualified, but it is striking when compared to the women’s team.  Both leagues 
have a bigger talent pool than most other countries, and many say because the 
men’s season is longer, they need more rest.  But consider the female players 
who play in the WNBA and overseas year-round, all while making less money 
than the men.  Both male and female athletes put their bodies on the line, have 
possible financial losses if they are injured, and need the time to rest.  This  
situation is identical for female college basketball players who have to wait 
four years to enter the WNBA while the male college basketball players only 
have to wait one year.  One begins to question whether female athletes will 
ever be treated similar to male athletes or if this perpetual inequality between 
athletes based on their sex will continue. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The WNBA should be applauded for lasting twenty years.  It has inspired 
many female athletes, and in some ways has broken the glass ceiling in athlet-
ics.  But for all of the league’s accomplishments, there still seems to be a huge  
disparity in treatment between male and female basketball players.  Why is it 
less acceptable for male athletes to receive a degree and more encouraged for 
them to become professional athletes at an earlier age than female athletes?  
This Comment is critical of both sides, men not being encouraged academical-
ly and women not being encouraged athletically, but the larger focus is on why 
the WNBA is limiting its opportunities and future by not allowing younger 
players to enter the league.  A prime example would be Breanna Stewart from 
the  
University of Connecticut.  She has been one of the most talked about players 
in women’s college basketball and just completed her first season in the 
WNBA.  If she were a male, sports commentators would most likely have rec-
ognized her as a prime “one-and-done” player.  
An athlete may not be able to bring successful claims under antitrust law 
or labor law, but this does not mean that the league and Players Association 
could not initiate the change.  As noted in an article by Kate Fagan discussing 
the debate surrounding Jewell Loyd’s draft, a surcharge of student-athletes to 
                                                                                                                 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/sports/olympics/usa-basketball-
curry-lebron-james-kyrie-irving.html?_r=0. 
141. Experienced 12-Member U.S. Olympic Women’s Basketball Team Announced, USA 
BASKETBALL (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.usab.com/news-events/news/2016/04/2016-woly-team-
named.aspx. 
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the WNBA might be the wave of the future and could improve the WNBA.142  
With the recent change in women’s college basketball moving from a period 
system to a quarter system, like that used in the WNBA, it is even easier for 
players to smoothly transition from the college level to the professional level.   
Additionally, the growing dispute over whether student-athletes should be paid 
during their time in college presents another component that will influence 
how female basketball players feel about the Age/Education Policy.  If male 
athletes are the only ones to receive compensation, then women are placed at 
an even greater economic disadvantage, since men would receive more money 
than them at both the collegiate and professional levels.  
Overall, the continual disparity in treatment and perception of female  
athletes will hold the WNBA back from growing.  Allowing younger players 
into the league can add excitement to the game and could allow veterans an 
opportunity to rest while their teams still maintain their competitive edge.  The 
Age/Education Policy is an exemplary example of how female athletes are still 
prompted to do the “right” thing by staying in school, compared to male ath-
letes who are less inclined to receive a college education simply because so-
ciety is more accepting of male athletes.  Even though a female student-athlete 
more than likely would not be able to bring a successful labor lawsuit against 
the WNBA, it could strike a chord with the league to truly reevaluate how the 
rule affects the game and players.  The WNBA’s Age/Education Policy should 
be less restrictive and allow female players the same opportunity as their male 
counterparts to consider the viability of leaving college early and entering their 
respective professional leagues. 
                                                
142. See Fagan, supra note 2. 
